Source: IRCAM 2003/2004. Note 5% represents roughly 330 schools

The projections presented in Table 1 demonstrate IRCAM’s commitment to the integration of Tamazight in primary education. The progressive increase was hoped to provide time to accommodate the training of teachers and the development of pedagogical materials necessary for the successful teaching of Tamazight.

Likewise, Table 2 presents IRCAM’s projections for the incorporation of Tamazight in middle school beginning in the 2005/2006 academic year. The plan anticipated that 25% of schools would be offering Tamazight during the first phase of implementation, representing 400 schools. The number was expected to double in 2006/2007 and rise to 75% in 2007/2008 before reaching full integration in 2008/2009. The 2nd and 3rd years of middle school were projected to follow the same trajectory, with complete coverage for 2nd year and 75% for 3rd year in 2009/2010.

Table 2: Percentage of Middle schools expected to integrate Amazigh in their program between 2005/2006 and 2009/2010

Source: IRCAM 2003/2004. Note: 25% is expected to represent 400 middle schools by 2005/2006 academic year.

Finally, Table 3 shows the estimated percentage of high schools expected to incorporate Tamazight between 2005/2006 and 2009/2010. Similar to middle school, the implementation plan projected 25% of first year high schools to introduce Tamazight in 2005/2006. This percentage was projected to increase gradually to 50%, 75%, and 100% by 2008/2009. The second and third year were expected to follow the same pattern, reaching 100% and 75% coverage respectively by 2009/2010.

Source: IRCAM 2003/2004. Note: 25% is expected to represent 200 high schools by 2005/2006 academic year.

Collectively, the three tables show IRCAM’s ambitious projections to achieve a comprehensive incorporation of Tamazight in the education system in Morocco. The anticipated expansion would reflect a broader language policy overhaul aimed at strengthening the position and status of Tamazight in the country.  However, the years of implementation proved the projections to be just mere ambitions. The successive governments never adopted a national strategy to ensure the implementation of IRCAM’s plans. On the contrary, bureaucratic hurdles and delays were put in place to ensure the failure of the whole project.

1.2.The implementation of the policy

Given the highly politicized nature of language policy in general and the Amazigh issue in particular, successive governments and the regional academies under their purview have often had an interest in exaggerating the figures and statistics to present the implementation in a favorable light.  For years, the Ministry of Education and IRCAM maintained a narrative that highlighted the successful implementation of the policy. However, concerns were raised even within IRCAM regarding the limited teaching of Tamazight and its subsequent gradual decline.[25]

The statistics provided by IRCAM concerning the 2009/2010 academic year present a different picture from the ambitious projections mentioned above. As illustrated in Table 4 below, Tamazight was only taught in 26% of all primary schools across Morocco. This figure falls considerably short of earlier projections of national expansion of Tamazight into primary education by the 2009/2010 academic year.  The data reveal a significant gap between policy goals and actual outcomes.

Table 4: Number of schools teaching Amazigh according to regions

Source: IRCAM 2010

Table 4 further demonstrates important regional disparities in the implementation of Tamazight teaching. The highest percentages are present in Meknes (67%) and Souss-Massa (56%), regions with a relatively dominant Amazigh-speaking population. In contrast, several other regions exhibited very low levels of Tamazight instruction, including Tangier (1%), Doukkala (2%), Gharb (3%) and Chaouia (3%). The disparities suggest that the implementation of the policy is not a coherent national strategy.

The Ministry of Education’s statistics provide additional evidence of the limited success of Amazigh language instruction. According to Boukous, only 15% of all primary school students in Morocco study Tamazight, while only 4% of teachers were involved in its teaching.[26]

Further evidence of the stagnation of the Amazigh language policy can be gleaned from the decline in the number of students studying Tamazight across grade levels during the 2008-2009 academic year, as illustrated in Table 5.

Table 5: Number of students who study Amazigh according to their level 2008-2009

Source: IRCAM 2010

Table 5 shows a sharp decline in the number of students studying Tamazight as they progress through primary education. While 186,983 first grade students were taught Tamazight, the number decreased subsequently at each level, reaching 15,008 students in the 6th grade. The sharp decline reflects the absence of vertical continuity in the implementation process and further reveals the incongruency of policy and practice. 

Additional evidence that further confirms the failure of the projections of the Ministry of Education concerns the number of students studying Amazigh during the 2009-2010. Of the 3,518,753 students in primary education, only 527,025 studied Tamazight, representing 14.97% of the student population. 

Taken together, the numbers reveal a profound discrepancy between policy planning and policy implementation. The ambitious projections contrast sharply with the realities of implementation on the ground. It appears as though the Ministry of Education left the implementation of the teaching of Amazigh language to chance. In many cases, official documents list numbers of schools, for example, where Tamazight is supposed to be taught, but where teachers are asked to teach other subjects. For instance, the director of the Directorate of the Ministry of Education in Agadir Ida OuTanane underlined the drop in the number of teachers teaching Tamazight in the region in an interview conducted in December 2016. He noted that of the 35 trained and qualified teachers of Tamazight, who were active in the 2015/2016 academic year, only five teachers were still teaching Tamazight in 2016/2017 academic year.

More recently, the growing number of graduates with BA degrees in Amazigh Studies and the establishment of four teacher-training Centers in Inzegane, Marrakech, Meknes, and Nador, has increased the number of qualified Amazigh language teachers. Despite these developments, the improvisation in the implementation of the inclusion of Tamazight in education still persists. The Ministry of Education acknowledged that of the 11,000 teachers who were trained to teach Tamazight 6000 were reassigned to teach other subjects.

Furthermore, these teachers need rigorous supervision to ensure an appropriate and successful teaching of Tamazight, something that they cannot be provided with because of the dearth of inspectors and supervisors, who total 16 nationally[27]. Similarly, the number of the teacher trainers specialized in Tamazight at the Regional Training Centers declined from 60 teacher trainers in 2009 to only 17 in 2015 (Ministry of education, 2015/2016 report). The same report concluded that 90% of students studying Tamazight do not benefit from continuous Amazigh instruction throughout primary school.[28] That is, unlike other subjects, students rarely get continuous exposure to Tamazight from grade 1 to grade 6.

Bureaucratic delays and mismanagement of human resources continue to hinder the generalization of Tamazight teaching. Twenty years after its introduction into the educational system, Amazigh language instruction in primary schools has declined rather than increased. Despite years of promises, the Ministry of Education admitted the failure to meet the 2009/2010 goal of incorporating Tamazight in all public schools.

On January 8th, 2024, the Ministry of education acknowledged that Tamazight was being taught in only 31% of primary schools nationwide. The Ministry once again announced a new projection, promising a coverage of 50% of schools by 2025/2026 and full generalization by 2029/2030. However, the new objectives have been presented without a detailed strategic plan or clear implementation measures, raising concerns about whether the hurdles that characterized previous phases of the implementation will be appropriately addressed.[29]

1.3.  Problems of implementation

The hasty decision to introduce Tamazight in schools proved to be one of the major impediments to the successful implementation of the Amazigh language policy.  The integration of Tamazight in the educational system was not primarily a linguistic proposition but rather a political measure aimed to appease Amazigh demands. The reality on the ground shows the absence of a clear vision and a comprehensive implementation strategy, resulting in considerable improvisation. Consequently, the teaching of Tamazight encountered many challenges, ranging from official/institutional resistance and unfavorable attitudes to a shortage of qualified teachers and pedagogical problems.

One of the most significant challenges confronting the implementation of the Amazigh language policy is the persistence of negative attitudes towards the language. A case in point is the negative attitude of the officials in the regional centers who are supposed to supervise the implementation of this new policy. Many perceive the policy merely as compensation for the historical marginalization of Amazigh-speaking communities rather than as a genuine effort to promote linguistic diversity and equality. Such perceptions undermine the effectiveness of the policy and weaken institutional commitment to its implementation.

Ministerial delegates in regional centres have often contributed to this resistance, thereby hindering the implementation process. In the absence of effective legal mechanisms capable of enforcing the Amazigh language policy, regional authorities have, at times, cancelled Amazigh language classes and reassigned teachers trained specifically for Amazigh instruction to teach French or Arabic instead. Such practices have been reported in areas including Rabat, Tinghir, and Chtouka Ait Baha (Ministry of Education, 2015–2016). Moreover, the directors of the Directorates of the Ministry of Education, who were/are expected to play a central role in implementing the policy, frequently fail to enforce Ministerial Notes 130, 133, and 116, which provide guidelines for the teaching of Amazigh. This non-compliance often occurs without any sanctions from the Ministry of Education.

Bureaucratic obstacles have continued to affect Amazigh language teaching. For example, Amazigh teachers have been unable to benefit fully from Al-Haraka Al-Intiqaliya (teacher transfers) because the Ministry's online transfer platform does not recognize Amazigh as a teaching specialization. Consequently, teachers wishing to transfer must apply under the categories of Arabic or French. Once transferred, school administrators frequently assign them to teach these subjects rather than Amazigh, further undermining the institutionalization of the language within the educational system.

Furthermore, attitudes towards Tamazight have not changed despite its incorporation in the educational system and its recognition as one of two official languages in Morocco since July 2011.[30] Generally, successful language policies should seek a change in the beliefs and attitudes of the people towards a language before expecting widespread acceptance and adoption of a language.[31]  Advocating a change in the linguistic practices of the people without considering their attitudes and beliefs would eventually prove unsuccessful in the long run. This is very pertinent in our context because the Amazigh language policy proposes a change in the status of Tamazight, which, in turn, entails a change in the beliefs and attitudes of Moroccans towards the Amazigh language.

The data from this study, however, show that such change is an unattainable objective. The policy should have included awareness campaigns to change the attitudes of Moroccans towards Tamazight before venturing into its teaching. The failure to change people’s perceptions and attitudes towards Tamazight will continue to undermine the effectiveness of the policy and its implementation.

Another significant challenge concerns the shortage of adequately trained human resources. Insufficient teacher training and the teaching methods used in the early years have limited the effectiveness of Amazigh language teaching. The lack of teacher training is regarded as the main impediment of the implementation of the Amazigh language policy. Teachers who play a pivotal role in carrying out any educational policy need to have strong pedagogical training. However, the teachers who were first recruited as volunteers to teach Tamazight received only two weeks of training to teach a language in a script they were not familiar with. Their only qualifications were being teachers who received a two year-long training to teach Arabic or French. The unsound pedagogical decisions of the Ministry of Education are clearly demonstrated in its hiring of non-Amazigh speakers, especially in the early years of the experience, to teach a language they do not speak and by offering three days to two weeks of training to the newly appointed teachers. In the light of these facts, teachers used outdated methods to teach Amazigh.[32]

1.4.  Hidden agenda

Nobody can deny that the introduction of Tamazight in education and its subsequent official recognition represent a U-turn in the legal and cultural discrimination against the Imazighen. However, to reiterate Shohamy’s argument, “the mere act of declaring certain languages as official does not carry with it much meaning in terms of actual practice.”[33] Being official does not guarantee Amazigh’s full integration in all domains. Rather, it can be viewed as a politically motivated decision and “an important mechanism by which [it can] manage the social and political conflict.”[34]  In this regard, Sadiqi has argued that the change in Morocco’s language policy is a political strategy rather than a genuine effort to revitalize Amazigh. The promotion of Tamazight was used as “a shield against the growing Islamist ideology and the Middle Eastern Homogenizing Pan-Arabism.”[35] The state’s opening up to Morocco’s indigenous language is therefore part of a political strategy to co-opt and contain the ACM’s struggle for a larger recognition of Imazighen’s socioeconomic and cultural rights. Late King Hassan II used manipulative ethnic politics, which required “playing different factions off against one another, thereby gathering decisive power into his own hands” (Edward H. quoted in Silverstein and Crawford, 2004, 48).

Sociolinguist Mohamed Errihani (2007) explains that Tamazight was recognized and promoted under political pressure, not linguistic necessity. Its integration into education was part of an on-going policy of co-optation and containment that the state has consistently employed to pacify its potential opponents. The publication of the Amazigh Manifesto in March 2000 and the political unrest in Kabyle in neighboring Algeria in 2001 galvanized an Amazigh ethnic and linguistic militancy that needed to be contained through concessions and compromises.

Thus, the introduction of Tamazight into education was politically motivated. The state has been pragmatic in its approach to the Amazigh question in the sense that it recognized the right of the language to be taught in schools not because of genuine interest in its revival and promotion, but in order to maintain the power and reputation of the political apparatus that runs the country. In Morocco, the “ruling ideology is that of the monarch, insistent upon loyalty, suspicious of the Berber identity [aimed] to incorporate rather than repress.”[36] Anthropologist David Crawford suggests that the creation of IRCAM and the integration of Amazigh in schools stems from the desire of the monarchy to divest itself of the responsibility toward anything Amazigh.[37] This interpretation is plausible given the fact that the monarchy has never addressed the regression in the teaching of Amazigh. Buckner notes this policy is a device to appease and hedge opposition than “a sincere initiative to teach language.”[38]

Pressure from international organizations, the ACM, and the monarchy to produce tangible results hastened the launch of a policy that lacked adequate planning. As a result of these circumstances, language policy planning was sacrificed for political ends.[39] Further, the state designed “a bureaucratic oversight” over the integration of Amazigh in public schools to ensure its failure.[40]

Tamazight in Morocco presents a case of the intersection of overt policy discourse and covert ideological practices. Its recognition as an official language in 2011 signaled a shift from its previous marginalization. However, its implementation has revealed hidden mechanisms put in place to limit the success of Amazigh revitalization and ensure the continued dominance of Arabic and French as the de facto official languages.

2. Policy devices limiting the success of Amazigh revitalization

Although the state has recognized Tamazight and funded its integration in schools since 2003, it is indisputable – as shown from our analysis above – that the state has simultaneously fostered conditions that have prevented Amazigh language-in-education policy from being successful. The ‘bureaucratic oversight’ that is put in place to ensure that the policy struggles from its inception is now being reinforced by legal texts or policy formulation where restrictive mechanisms are embedded in the hope of turning the Amazigh language revitalization into language devitalization.

2.1.  Constitutional ambiguity

The first such a text is the 2011 constitution. Being the supreme law of the land, a constitution defines the identity of the state and its national languages. As with the previous constitutions (1962 and 1996), the 2011 has outlined the proclamations delineating the language policy of the country. Article 5 of the new constitution names Arabic and Amazigh as the two official languages of Morocco: 

تظل العربية اللغة الرسمية للدولة. وتعمل الدولة على حمايتها وتطويرها، وتنمية استعمالها. تعد الأمازيغية أيضا لغة رسمية للدولة، باعتبارها رصيدا مشتركا لجميع المغاربة بدون استثناء. يحدد قانون تنظيمي مراحل تفعيل الطابع الرسمي للأمازيغية، وكيفيات إدماجها في مجال التعليم، وفي مجالات الحياة العامة ذات الأولوية، وذلك لكي تتمكن من القيام مستقبلا بوظيفتها، بصفتها لغة رسمية.

Arabic remains [demeure] the official language of the State. The State works for the protection and for the development of the Arabic language, as well as the promotion of its use. Likewise, Tamazight [Berber/amazighe] constitutes an official language of the State, being the common patrimony of all Moroccans without exception. An organic law defines the process of implementation of the official character of this language, as well as the modalities of its integration into teaching and into the priority domains of public life, so that it may be permitted in time to fulfill its function as an official language.
(Jefri J. Ruchti Translation)

A textual analysis of the Article remains, however, crucial to cogently delineate the status and functions allocated to Tamazight in the new Constitution. The first thing that jumps out in the investigation of the wording of Article 5 is the preamble “Arabic is demeure / remains / تبقى ’ the official language of the state. The use of the word ‘demeure’ could be interpreted in a way that it signifies the continuity of the privileged status conferred to Arabic since independence. The preamble clearly sets out not to redefine the status of the existing languages in Morocco, but to consolidate the status of Arabic as the official language of the state. Something that can easily be seen in the use of the definite determiner ‘the’ to modify the official status of Arabic and the use ‘an’ – the indefinite article – to modify Amazigh, which according to Boukous “peut être interpreté comme signifiant une langue parmi d’autres”(can be interpreted to mean one language among others).[41] Clearly, article 5 confers a notion of singularity upon Arabic and sustains a hierarchical linguistic order in Morocco, in which Arabic is the primary official language and Tamazight occupies a secondary position.

Maintaining the legal superiority of Arabic over Tamazight was certainly behind the changes made to the final draft of the 2011 Constitution that was presented to the monarch. According to professor Lahcen Oulhaj, a member of the committee for the constitutional reform, the original draft presented to the King eliminated the presumed superiority of Arabic and placed Tamazight on an equal footing with Arabic. The draft states that ‘اللغتان العربية والأمازبغية هما اللغتان الرسميتان للدولة’, proclaimed professor Oulhaj.[42] He further explained that subsequent changes were introduced by Mohamed Moatassim, the king’s advisor, who headed the constitutional reform committee in collaboration with the Istiqlal party and the PJD party.

Another important aspect of the article, which strengthens this interpretation concerns the state responsibilities toward these languages. With regard to Arabic, the state “works for its protection and for its development, as well as the promotion of its use.” This explicit prescription of the state’s responsibilities towards Arabic contrasts sharply with its approach to Tamazight, whose future was tied to organic laws that are open to political and partisan debate in parliament.  Worse, it took almost 8 years for the laws to be passed; a delay that provided the state bureaucracy ample opportunity to stall the full integration of Tamazight in official domains and contributed to its regression in the education system.[43]

Equally important is the absence of any specification as to what variety the term “Arabic” designates. It is not clear whether the generic term refers to MSA or CA and whether it encompasses Darija or not. This confusion was created after the independence and has been sustained by the current constitution posits that Tamazight is in competition not only with CA and MSA but also with Darija. The perpetuation of this ambiguity in the formulation of article 5 legitimizes the use of Darija in domains that should have been reserved for the two official languages. We can even go further and argue that the formulation deliberately favors Arabic and operates to safeguard its alleged superiority and its varieties, which, one could submit, seem to deserve protection at the expense of Tamazight.

The ambiguity of article 5 allows for politically motivated interpretations[44] and resulted in the delayed passing of the organic law relative to Tamazight  which  defines “the process of implementation of the official character of this language, as well as the modalities of its integration into teaching and into the priority domains of public life, so that it may be permitted in time to fulfil its function as an official language” (Article 5, 2011 Constitution).

2.2.  New vision for education and Amazigh language teaching

The new formulated educational policy laid out in the 2015 to 2030 report of Le Conseil Supérieur de l’ Éducation et de la Formation et de la Recherche Scientifique – CSEFRS –  (The Higher Council for Education, Training, and Scientific Research), “Pour une école de l’équité, de la qualité et de la promotion”[45] epitomizes the undisputed negative orientation of the state towards Tamazight and clearly shows that its  teaching has been part of a policy of appeasement rather than a genuine attempt to revitalize the language. The strategic vision for the improvement and reform of the educational system by 2030 rests on three major principles: (1) equity and equal opportunity in language learning, (2) conformity with the status of official languages in the Constitution, and (3) the establishment of a gradual and balanced plurilingualism. The new vision declares that this state of “balanced plurilingualism” will be achieved through “l’alternance linguistique” (linguistic alternation) whereby Arabic remains “la principale langue d’enseignement” (p.46) and where French and English are taught initially as subjects but incorporated in secondary cycles as media of instructions for scientific subjects. The policy places a great deal of emphasis on proficiency in Arabic and two foreign languages (French and English).              

Tamazight, on the other hand, is excluded from this plurilingual framework and designated to be “une langue enseignée’’ but never a language of instruction. Furthermore, the report is a serious setback for the Amazigh language teaching in the sense that it reverses the most important goal stipulated in the Pedagogical Guidelines for the Teaching of Amazigh (الدليل المنظم لتدريس اللغة الأمازيغية, 2006) and which requires the pupils to acquire literacy skills of reading, writing, and speaking in Amazigh.[46] Instead, the new vision relegates Amazigh to a ‘language of communication’ putting emphasis only on the oral aspect of the learning of the language. The report stipulates that “les deux premières années d’apprentissage de cette langue seront axées sur les compétences de communication, avant d’entamer, durant les années suivantes, l’intégration de l’écrit” (the focus in the first two years will be on developing communication skills, before starting, in the following years, to integrate writing skills).[47]

Regarding the generalization of Amazigh language teaching to elementary and secondary cycles, the new vision reiterates the old mantra of ‘progressive generalization’ without providing any concrete details as to how and when. The new vision reproduces the failed language policy implemented since the independence, argues Id Belkacem who says that: 

أكبر مشكل في الاستراتيجية هي آنها تعيد إنتاج السياسة اللغوية التي بدأت مع الاستقلال والتي لم تعط أي نتيجة، الهدف الرئيسي هو التمكن من اللغة العربية كتابة وحديثا، لكن المغاربة لن يصلوا أبدا إلى درجة التمكن المراد لهم لأن الأمازيغية والدارجة لغتان مخلفتان عن لغة القرآن، الرؤية الاستراتيجية باختصار هي تدمير متواصل لمستقبل المغاربة في التعليم.

The biggest problem with the new strategy is that it re-produces the language policy that started with independence, and which failed to meet its objectives. The main goal was for Moroccans to be able to write and speak Arabic, but Moroccans will never reach the degree of mastery of Arabic that was intended because Amazigh and Darija are different from the language of the Qur’an. The new vision ensures the continued destruction of the educational future of Moroccans.[48]

The new vision for education – as it is – perpetuates and cements the “prevailing institutionalized linguistic hierarchies regulating the uneven distribution of power and privileges" (Kabel, 2018, p. 488). It posits MSA and foreign languages – French and English – at the highest echelon and relegates Amazigh to a language of oral communication. 

2.3.  The return to Amazigh dialectilization

The restrictive mechanisms used by the state to impede the Amazigh language revitalization and to ensure the failure of the Amazigh language policy can best be seen in the ‘project of Law 26.16 for the organic laws.’ The organic law, which defines the implementation of Tamazight as an official language was passed in 2019, after eight years of delay. The political context surrounding this delay is quite revealing.

Following the adoption of the 2011 constitution, Morocco was governed by the Islamist-led government, first under Abdelilah Benkirane (2011-2017) and later under Saadeddine Othmani (2017-2021). Despite the constitutional recognition of Tamazight, Benkirane’s government made little progress towards passing and implementing the organic law required by Article 5. The law was repeatedly delayed and only adopted in the final years of the PJD-led government. By delaying the adoption of the organic law for nearly a decade, the PJD government contributed to the sluggish incorporation of Tamazight into education, public administration, and other official domains. Worse, the passed law appears to have been designed to constrain Tamazight rather than revive it.

The first thing that stands out in the bill is its return to the dialectilization of Tamazight. The bill appears to sharply deviate from the objectives of the Constitution as it discards the standardized norm developed by IRCAM and puts forward an ambiguous definition of Tamazight. The bill in Article 1 defines Tamazight that is concerned with the official implementation to be all the varieties spoken all over Morocco rather than the standardized one. In article 1, "يقصد باللغة الأمازيغية في مدلول مشروع هذا القانون التنظيمي مختلف التعبيرات اللسانية الأمازيغية المتداولة بمختلف مناطق المغرب، وكذا المنتوج اللسني والمعجمي الأمازيغي الصادر عن المؤسسات والهيئات المختصة"  (The Amazigh language in the draft bill is intended to encompass all the Amazigh varieties in the different regions of Morocco, and the Amazigh linguistic and lexical production issued by the appropriate institutions and authorities).

As it stands, Tamazight will never be able to fulfil its functions as an official language (Constitution, 2011) because according to the bill, it is not one single language but ‘لهجات’ which cannot all be officially recognized. The dialectilization of Tamazight is further exemplified in article 4 of the bill, which calls for the employment of Tamazight regional linguistic expressions, that is dialects, in the educational system to facilitate the teaching of some school subjects. Defining Tamazight in such terms pertains to the ideological assumptions constructed around the language for years. That is, Tamazight is not a language; it is a dialect or rather dialects. In defining Amazigh as dialects, the 26.16 bill attempts to reverse the constitutional recognition of Amazigh as one in order to minimize any prospect of Amazigh integration in public official domains.

2.4.  The dissolution of IRCAM and the continuous co-optation of the Amazigh issue

Although the establishment of IRCAM in 2001 has been hailed as a reversal of cultural discrimination against Imazighen and their language and culture, the ineffectiveness in advancing the Amazigh cause and the continuous bureaucratic foot-dragging in education and the media created a feeling of frustration and anger among MCA activists.[49] Many more view the creation of such a cultural institution to be a manifestation of an institutional policy of containment and co-optation of the Amazigh struggle. They see the decision to create IRCAM as a veiled ploy to pacify the MCA and separate Moroccan activists from those in Algeria or diaspora.[50] The project of law 04.16 cannot but be a confirmation of the state’s deliberate co-optation policy. The creation of the National Council for the Moroccan Languages and Cultures (Conseil National des Langues et de la Culture Marocaine) by the 2011 Constitution seems to undermine the status of IRCAM, says Boukous.[51] Under the auspices of the new council, IRCAM – the once independent institution – will now be subsumed under a council whose objective is the promotion of regional linguistic varieties over the standardized Tamazight, which IRCAM has been working on for more than a decade. Additionally, Article 50 of the draft bill 04.16 for the creation of CNLM cites that IRCAM will cease to exist in its current structure. 

يحل المجلس الوطني محل المعهد الملكي للثقافة الأمازيغية في كافة حقوقه والتزاماته

ولهذا الغرض، تنقل إلى المجلس الوطني، مجانا، العقارات والمنقولات وحقوق الملكية الفكرية المملوكة للمعد الملكي للثقافة الأمازيغية، كما تنقل إليه ملكية الأرشيف والوثائق والملفات الموجودة في تاريخ دخول هذا القانون التنظيمي حيز التنفيذ في حوزة المعهد الملكي للثقافة الأمازيغية.

كما تنقل إلى المجلس الوطني الاعتمادات المالية المفتوحة باسم المعهد في الميزانية العامة للدولة، والأرصدة المالية الموجودة في حساباته البنكية، في تاريخ دخول هذا القانون التنظيمي حيز التنفيذ. "

وتنقل إلى المجلس الوطني آيضا جميع الحقوق والالتزامات المتعلقة بكافة صفقات الدراسات والأشغال والتوريدات، وكذا جميع العقود والاتفاقيات المبرمة من قبل المعهد الملكي للثقافة الأمازيغية، قبل دخول هذا القانون التنظيمي حيز التنفيذ.

The National Council replaces the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture in all its rights and obligations. For this purpose, the property, movables and intellectual property rights owned by the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture shall be transferred to the National council free of charge. The archives, documents and files shall also be transferred to the National council upon entry into force of this law.

The financial allocations made in the name of the Institute and the financial balances in its bank accounts shall be transferred to the National Council upon entry into force of this Law.

All rights and obligations relating to all studies, works and supplies, as well as all contracts and agreements concluded by the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture, shall be transferred to the National Council before the entry into force of this Act. (Translation mine)

In his reaction to the project de loi 04.16, Boukous contends that it “disseminates confusion instead of answering questions regarding CNLCM”.[52] He goes further to say that the orientation adopted in the project aligns with the Islamists and the Istiqlal party’s agenda. The project is a step in the direction towards “تقليص المعهد وربما تقزيمه”, that is undermining IRCAM and minimizing its role, says Boukous.  Additionally, the law revives the politics of Tamazight’s dialectilization, perpetuating the stigmatized view that this language is just a dialect. 

The establishment of the new council clearly targets IRCAM and is bound to limit its role and functions as an independent institution. The PJD-led coalition government submitted an amendment to Article 51 of the regulatory law of the council regarding the Institute for Research and Studies of Arabization.[53] The amendment stipulates that the institution will remain independent and will not be subsumed by the new language council. The council was supposed to include the various institutions dealing with national languages, but the new amendment seems to exclude MSA. This confirms our argument that MSA is placed in a hierarchical position above Amazigh. 

Conclusion

The state has shifted the Moroccan linguistic landscape by introducing the teaching of Tamazight and recognizing it as an official language breaking away from past marginalization. But devising a new language policy may not translate into actual practice, when ideological mechanisms are put into laws and obstacles are invented to make it impossible for that policy to succeed. This article has examined how the “bureaucratic oversight” overshadowed the implementation of the Amazigh language-in-education policy and how covert ideological mechanisms embedded in the drafted laws perpetuate language practices that favor MSA and foreign languages and condemn Tamazight to remain on the peripheries. The article has highlighted the regression in the teaching of Tamazight and the failure of the state to meet its projections of generalizing its teaching to all schools and all levels since its recognition as an official language in 2011. The article concludes that although the state may proclaim the importance of teaching Morocco’s indigenous language, “the mechanisms of ideological control” exercised especially through the 2011 constitution,[54] the new vision for education, and the organic laws as well as the project of law 04.16 sustain and perpetuate de facto language practices that devalue Tamazight and maintain the superiority of Arabic. Accordingly, the revitalization of Tamazight is transformed into a process of de facto devitalization.

The failure of the implementation of Amazigh language policy will certainly have dire consequences not only on its teaching but also on its cultural revival and wider function in society. It is established that language teaching is a primary mechanism to create literate communities for the target language. If the teaching of Tamazight fails to gain momentum, fewer people will achieve literacy in standardized Tamazight taught in the official alphabet of Tifinagh. This will directly limit the number of readers of cultural production in Tamazight, increasingly prompting creative producers to abandon their mother tongue as a medium for cultural and intellectual output and critical engagement. 

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[1]  Silverstein, Paul A., and David Crawford. “Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State.” Middle East Report, no. 233 (Winter 2004), 44.

[2] Tollefson, James W. Planning Language, Planning Inequality (New York: Longman, 1991), 170.

[3] Amazigh is also used as a generic term to refer to the varieties spoken instead of Berber or Tamazight particularly in Morocco. The term Berber is viewed to be pejorative while Tamazight can be confusing as it also refers to the variety spoken in the Middle Atlas and the Central part of Morocco.

[4] Ayache, Albert. Histoire ancienne de l’Afrique du Nord. (Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1964); Laroui, Abdallah. Les origines culturelles du nationalisme marocain. (Paris: François Maspero, 1977); Chafik, Mohamed. “Pour l’élaboration du berbère ‘classique’ à partir du berbère courant.” In Actes de la 1ère Rencontre de l’Université d’Été d’Agadir. (Agadir: Association l’Université d’Été, 1982).

[5] El Kirat, Yamina, and Y. Boussagui. “Can Amazigh Be Saved? The Implications of the Revitalization of an Indigenous Language.” In Linguistic Diversity, Minority Languages and Sustainable Development, edited by I. Idiazabal and M. Perez-Caurel, 204–15. (Bilbao: Fondation Azkue, 2019).

[6] Boukous, Ahmed. Société, langues et cultures au Maroc: Enjeux symboliques. (Rabat: Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines de Rabat, 1995) ; Sadiqi, Fatima. “The Place of Berber in Morocco.” International Journal of the Sociology of Language 123 (1997).

[7] Ennaji, Moha. Multilingualism, Cultural Identity, and Education in Morocco. (New York: Springer, 2005).

[8] El Kirat, Yamina. “Some Causes of the Beni Iznassen Berber Language Loss.” In Langues et stigmatisation sociale au Maghreb, Peuples Méditerranéens 79 (1997); El Kirat, Yamina. “The Current Status and Future of the Amazigh Language in the Beni Iznassen Community.” Languages & Linguistics 8 (2001); El Kirat, Yamina. The Lexical and Morphological Structure of the Beni Iznassen Amazigh Language in a Context of Language Loss. PhD diss. (Mohammed V University, Rabat, 2004).

[9] El Kirat, The Lexical and Morphological Structure of the Beni Iznassen Amazigh Language in a Context of Language Loss; Boukous, Ahmed. Revitalizing the Amazigh Language: Stakes, Challenges and Strategies (Rabat: Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe, 2011); Marley, Dawn. “Language Attitudes in Morocco Following Recent Changes in Language Policy.” Language Policy 3 (2004), 27.

[10] Royal Decree n° 1–01–299 (2001).

[11] Tollefson, James W. "Critical theory in language policy”, in An introduction to language policy: Theory and method, ed. Thomas Ricento, (Balckwell Publishing, 2006).

[12] Shohamy, Elana. Language policy: Hidden agendas and new approaches (Routledge, 2006).

[13] Jernudd, Björn H., and Jyotirindra Das Gupta.  ‘Towards a theory of Language Planning’, in Can Language Be Planned? Sociolinguistic Theory and Practice for Developing Nations, Ed. J. Rubin and B. Jernudd, (Honolulu: The university of Hawaii press, 1971).

[14] Fairclough, Norman. Language and power. (Routledge, 2013); Pennycook, Alastair. The cultural politics of English as an international language (Routledge, 2017); Phillipson, Robert. Linguistic imperialism (Oxford university press, 1992); Phillipson, Robert, ed. Rights to language: Equity, power, and education (Routledge, 2000); Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove. Linguistic genocide in education--or worldwide diversity and human rights? (Routledge, 2013); Tollefson, James W. Planning Language, Planning Inequality (New York: Longman, 1991).

[15] Tollefson, Critical theory in language policy, 42-59

[16] Ibid., 42.

[17] Tollefson, Planning Language, Planning Inequality.

[18] Tollefson, Critical theory in language policy, 42-59; Shohamy, Language policy: Hidden agendas and new approaches.

[19] Boukous, Revitalizing the Amazigh Language: Stakes, Challenges and Strategies

[20] Ibid., 137.

[21] King Mohamed VI (Ajdir speech, 2001)

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Boukous, Ahmed. (IRCAM rector), in discussion with the author, February 12th, 2018.

[25] Assid, Ahmed. (IRCAM Researcher), in discussion with the author, May 16th, 2016.

[26] Boukous, Revitalizing the Amazigh Language: Stakes, Challenges and Strategies.

[27] Qassi, Abdellah. (Former coordinator of Amazigh Language teaching project at the ministry of Education), in discussion with the author, (January 12th, 2016)

[28]  Ibid.

[29] Ministerial note 028X23, May 23rd, 2023.

[30] El Kirat El Allame, Yamina. “Language Perdition and Revival: The Case of the Amazigh Language in Morocco.” In Who Can Act for the Humans? edited by T. Belghazi, M. R. Ezroura, and J. Judy, 85–108. (Rabat: Faculty of Letters & Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008); Errihani, Mohammed. Language Policy in Morocco: Implications of Recognizing and Teaching Berber. PhD diss., (University of Illinois at Chicago, 2007); Marley, Dawn. “Language Attitudes in Morocco Following Recent Changes in Language Policy.” Language Policy 3 (2004), 25–46.

[31] Schiffman, Harold F. Linguistic Culture and Language Policy, (London: Routledge, 1996); Spolsky, Bernard. Language Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[32]  Errihani, Mohammed. “Language Policy in Morocco: Problems and Prospects of Teaching Tamazight.” Journal of North African Studies 11, no. 2 (2006), 143–54.

[33] Shohamy, Language policy: Hidden agendas and new approaches, 61.

[34] Tollefson, James W., ed. Language policies in education, (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 5.

[35] Sadiqi, Fatima. “The Teaching of Amazigh (Berber) in Morocco.” Languages and Linguistics 25–26 (2010), 4.

[36] Brett, Michael, and Elizabeth Fentress. The Berbers. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1996), 267.

[37] Crawford, David. “Royal Interest in Local Culture: Amazigh Identity and the Moroccan Nation.” In Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies, ed. by Maya Shatzmiller. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005).

[38] Buckner, Elizabeth. “Language Drama in Morocco: Another Perspective on the Problems and Prospects of Teaching Tamazight.” Journal of North African Studies 11, no. 4 (2006), 427.

[39] Errihani, Language Policy in Morocco: Implications of Recognizing and Teaching Berber.

[40] Boukous, Discussion with the author, (February 12th, 2018).

[41] Boukous, Ahmed. “L’officialisation de l’amazighe : Enjeux et stratégies.” Asinag 8 (2013), 17.

[42] Oulhaj, Lahcen (former member of the committee for the constitutional reform), discussion with the author, (February 24th, 2018).

[43]The organic laws were passed on September 12, 2019 after long years of government foot-dragging and delays.

[44] Kabel, Ahmed. “Reclaiming Amazigh in a Time of Devitalization.” In The Routledge Handbook of Language Revitalization, (London: Routledge, 2018), 487.

[45] Le Conseil Supérieur de l’Éducation et de la Formation et de la Recherche Scientifique. New Vision for education,  (2015).

[46] الدليل المنظم لتدريس اللغة الأمازيغية, (2006)

[47]CSEFRS, New Vision for Education, 47.

[48] Id Belkacem, Hassan (Amazigh activist and lawyer) in discussion with the author, (March 3rd, 2018)

[49] Assid and Id BelKacem, discussion with the authors personal communications, May 16th, 2016 & March 3rd, 2018 respectively)

[50] Silverstein, Paul A., and David Crawford. “Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State.” Middle East Report, no. 233 (Winter 2004): 44–48.

[51] Boukous, Discussion with the author.

[52] Boukous, discussion with the author.

[53] Hespress, Friday, January 15th, 2020. https://www.hespress.com/societe/455145.html

[54] Shohamy, Language policy: Hidden agendas and new approaches, 90.